Commodity merchants use real option models to manage their operations. A central element of such a model is its underlying operating policy. We focus on network contracts for the transport capacity of natural gas pipelines, specific energy conversion assets. Practitioners commonly manage these contracts as portfolios of spread options. Although computationally fast, we show that this approach in general is heuristic, due to the suboptimality of its operating policy. We propose a different computationally efficient real option approach based on an optimal operating policy, integrating linear optimization and Monte Carlo simulation. We use our approach to benchmark the spread option approach in a numerical study based on market data and realistic instances. We find that our approach can substantially improve on the contract valuations computed by the spread option approach, especially for contracts with flexibility in their allowed capacity usage. We also show that the optimal operating policy of contracts with this flexibility is of the greedy type, while the one of contracts without it in general is not. However, we observe that greedy optimization yields a near optimal operating policy for the latter type of contracts with a substantially reduced computational effort. A version of our model was recently implemented by a major international energy trading company. Our model can also be employed to efficiently estimate the contract value sensitivities (the "Greeks"), which merchants use for financial hedging purposes. Potentially, our work has wider significance for the merchant management of other commodity conversion assets with payoffs determined by solving capacity constrained optimization models.
Introduction
Commodities play an important economic role. For example, natural gas is a major energy source in the United States (U.S.) and other industrialized countries. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA) it accounted for 24% of the total U.S. energy consumption in 2008 (EIA 2009b) . The EIA has projected that U.S. natural gas consumption will grow by 0.2% per year from 2009 to 2030 (EIA 2009a) .
Commodities are physically traded on spot and forward markets. Various commodity based financial derivatives are traded on organized and over-the-counter (OTC) markets (Geman 2005) . For instance, in North America natural gas is traded on both spot and forward markets at different geographical locations. Gas Daily, a widely circulated industry newsletter, includes more than 80 pricing points. These locational markets are connected by a web of about 160 interstate pipelines. The New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) trade financial contracts associated with about 40 locational markets in North America. These contracts include futures with physical delivery at Henry Hub, Louisiana, basis swaps (contracts on future price differences between Henry Hub and other locations), and put and call options on NYMEX futures. NYMEX, ICE, and OTC markets provide market participants with high price transparency.
The operations of merchants engaged in commodity trading involve the following activities:
(i) valuing and securing the capacity of commodity conversion assets, e.g., storage, processing, and transport facilities; (ii) using this capacity to support physical trading of the commodities associated with these assets, e.g., purchasing and selling these commodities at different locations and/or times; and (iii) financially hedging the physical trading cash flows, e.g., by trading commodity futures and options on these futures. Commodity merchants use real option models (Trigeorgis 1996) to manage their operations (Eydeland and Wolyniec 2003, Geman 2005) .
A central feature of such a model is its underlying operating policy. This policy specifies how to use the capacity of a commodity conversion asset and how to physically trade its associated commodities. The value of this policy is the value of this capacity, which the merchant uses to negotiate the capacity acquisition. The sensitivities of this value to market parameters, e.g., current futures prices, are called the "Greeks" and are used to instantiate a financial hedging policy (see, e.g., , Chapter 6, Hull 2012 ; that is, the financial trading policy is a byproduct of the operating policy. Thus, the operating policy directly impacts the three activities that characterize the operations of merchant commodity trading.
Natural gas pipelines are specific energy conversion assets that provide transportation services, including transport and storage, as well as market hub offerings, such as park and loan (Shively and Ferrare 2004, Section 7) . In the U.S., while natural gas wholesale markets are unregulated, interstate pipeline companies are federally regulated and act as common service providers, e.g., they do not own the gas they transport or store. Natural gas merchants must contract with a pipeline company for portions of its capacity to receive service. Pipeline companies sell their capacity through firm (guaranteed) and interruptible (best effort) contracts, whose minimum and maximum rates (prices) are regulated. Most firm transportation contracts are sold via sealed bid auctions run on pipeline web sites. In this paper we focus on firm transport contracts.
Merchants use pipeline transport capacity secured via contracts to support their physical trading activity. Merchants thus face two related problems at two different stages: (i) in the first stage, reserving portions of pipeline capacity via contracts; and, (ii) in the second stage, executing such contracts. The first problem involves the following contract configuration choices: deciding which zones and sections of a pipeline to include in a contract; how much capacity to reserve; and the contract tenor. During each period in a contract tenor, the second problem entails purchasing natural gas at spot markets corresponding to contract zones in supply areas; shipping this natural gas, according to the contract specification, to spot markets associated with contract zones in demand areas; and selling the shipped natural gas into these markets.
Shippers pay a demand charge for reserving pipeline capacity via a contract, irrespective of its usage (the demand charge is sometimes referred to as a reservation charge). They pay commodity and fuel related charges for using this capacity. A contract demand charge is a fixed monetary amount paid by the shipper during each period in a contract tenor; a contract commodity and fuel related charges together represent the variable cost of shipping natural gas via a contract.
A merchant would not agree to pay a demand charge for a contract if the first stage present value of such charge exceeded the value of such contract at its inception; that is, the value in the first stage of the cash flows that result from executing this contract in the second stage.
The two problems of contract configuration and contract execution are thus related: selecting among various contract configurations in the first stage requires valuing them at this time. In particular, the valuation of the contract chosen in the first stage supports a merchant's decision of how much to bid for this contract demand charge.
Our focus in this paper is on models to value the cash flows associated with a given contract configuration. In addition to supporting a merchant bidding decision for the demand charge of a contract, these models support a merchant in operationally executing a contract and financially hedging the resulting cash flows. These cash flows depend on the operating policy adopted for contract execution. We distinguish between point-to-point and network contracts for pipeline transport capacity.
Merchants optimally value point-to-point contracts as options on the spread between the prices of natural gas at two locations (Eydeland and Wolyniec 2003, Secomandi 2010a; see Deng et al. 2001 for the related valuation of electricity transmission capacity). The optimal operating policy underlying such contracts is straightforward, as it amounts to the optimal exercise of such a spread option: purchase, ship, and sell natural gas at capacity if and only if the spot price in the demand area exceeds the spot price in the supply area, after accounting for the marginal shipping cost.
In contrast to point-to-point contracts, network contracts allow merchants to ship natural gas in between more than two locations. Determining an optimal operating policy for a network contract is not straightforward. Simple adaptations of the spread option pricing approach are widespread among merchants to determine an operating policy for such contracts and, hence, to value and manage them. These approaches include a spread option valuation model and a model to select a portfolio of spread options to represent the network structure and capacity limits of a pipeline contract. The contract operating policy is determined by optimally exercising the spread options in this portfolio.
The main advantage of the spread option approach is that it quickly computes an operating policy for the network contract, as well as its value and Greeks. However, we show that this approach in general is heuristic, as it is based on a suboptimal operating policy (it is exact in special cases). We thus propose a different real option approach to estimate the value of a network contract based on an optimal operating policy. Our approach integrates linear optimization and Monte Carlo simulation in a computational efficient manner. To further improve the computational efficiency of our approach, we explore the use of a greedy algorithm (GA) to solve the linear programs that compute the contract operating policy. In general this is heuristic, but we show that it is optimal in some cases.
We use our approach to benchmark the practice based spread option approach on realistic instances, modeled after contracts available on the Transcontinental pipeline system. The valuations of our approach substantially outperform those of the spread option approach on these instances. This is entirely attributable to our use of an optimal operating policy. Furthermore, GA is nearly optimal and substantially faster than our exact method on these instances.
We also investigate the incremental value of structuring contracts with flexibility in the usage of their capacity. If these contracts are managed using an optimal operating policy, which we show can be computed in a greedy manner, then this value can be substantial. In contrast, the spread option approach is unable to fully value this flexibility, resulting in an even more pronounced suboptimality than in the case of contracts without flexibility.
Our research demonstrates the importance of using an optimal or near optimal operating policy to value and manage given network contracts for natural gas pipeline capacity. This work is relevant to merchants engaged in the shipping of natural gas on pipelines. Our pro-posed approach could allow merchants to improve the margin earned on existing contracts, as well as enhance the effectiveness of their bidding for the demand charge of new contracts. A version of our model was recently implemented at a major international energy trading company. Moreover, our model could be used to support contract configuration decisions.
Merchants would be reluctant to adopt a new operating policy if the computation of its associated Greeks could not be done efficiently and accurately. We thus also derive unbiased estimators of several Greeks of the value of the operating policy determined by our approach using direct sensitivity estimation methods (Glasserman 2004 , Chapter 7) based on a reduced form model (Seppi 2002 ) of natural gas price evolution. This model generalizes to multiple locations models presented by and Schwartz (1997) , as it features a spatial price correlation structure, and to more than two locations the model used by Secomandi (2010a) .
The use of our estimators makes computationally efficient the estimation of the Greeks via Monte Carlo simulation, as this estimation does not involve resimulation.
Our work is specific to one type of energy conversion asset, but it has potential relevance beyond this application. For example, this research could be extended to the case of assets to ship, transport, distribute, and refine other energy sources, such as coal, oil, and biofuels, and commodities, such as metals and agricultural products. That is, extensions of our approach could be relevant for the merchant management of other commodity and energy conversion assets whose payoffs are obtained by solving capacity constrained optimization models.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the novelty of our contributions relative to the extant literature. We describe the problem setting in §3. We present models for the valuation of contracts without and with capacity flexibility in §4 and §5, respectively. We discuss our computational results in §6. Section 7 concludes. An Online Appendix includes proofs of the results in the main text and our sensitivity (Greeks) estimators.
Literature Review
Our paper is related to the operations management literature on the interface between financial and operational decisions (see, e.g., Huchzermeier and Cohen 1996 , Birge 2000 , Van Mieghem 2003 , Gaur and Seshadri 2005 , Caldentey and Haugh 2006 , Ding et al. 2007 , Secomandi 2010a and the real option literature that deals with applications in commodity and energy industries (see, e.g., Smith and McCardle 1999 , Geman 2005 . We build on the work of Secomandi (2010a) by considering network, rather than point-to-point, contracts for natural gas pipeline transport capacity. We provide novel insights into the effectiveness of the spread option approach used in practice to deal with this problem. Our work complements that of Lai et al. (2010) , who benchmark practice based methods, including one based on spread options, to value natural gas storage contracts (see also Boogert and de Jong 2008 , Thompson et al. 2009 , Carmona and Ludkovski 2010 , Secomandi 2010b , Wu et al. 2010 ).
Methodologically, our contract valuation problem can be interpreted as the valuation of an exotic European option. This topic is well studied in the financial engineering literature (Hull 2012, Chapter 25, Broadie and Detemple 2004) . We refer the reader to Stulz (1982) , Johnson (1987) , Boyle and Tse (1990) , Carmona and Durrleman (2003) , and Li et al. (2008) for the valuation of spread and rainbow options, and to Gay and Manaster (1986) for the valuation of the cheapest-to-deliver option. Our problem is more difficult than these problems, as, in contrast to the payoffs of these options, the payoff of a network transport contract in general cannot be expressed in closed form. Accurate modeling of the operational aspects of our problem thus requires integrating linear optimization (Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis 1997) and Monte Carlo simulation valuation techniques (Glasserman 2004 ), which appears to be novel for the financial engineering literature on the valuation of exotic European options.
Moreover, we apply and slightly extend direct sensitivity (Greeks) estimation techniques (Glasserman 2004 , Chapter 7) to a novel version of a real option problem. An element of novelty in our application is showing that the pathwise method is applicable when the option payoff is the optimal objective function value of a linear program.
Problem Setting
This section introduces the problem that we study in this paper. Some of the presentation is based on material available in Secomandi (2010a, §3) . Natural gas pipelines transport natural gas from supply to demand areas. These facilities consist of receipt and delivery meters, where the natural gas is injected into and withdrawn out of the pipeline, respectively, pipes that connect different meters, and compressor stations that create pressure differentials to move natural gas. At the commercial level, pipelines are subdivided into zones, which aggregate several meters, pipes, and compressors. Figure 1 illustrates the Transcontinental pipeline and its subdivision into zones. A zone typically is associated with a market hub for natural gas.
Pipeline managers market their transport capacity to shippers -the owners, including merchants, of the natural gas transported by pipelines -in the form of contracts. There exist two basic types of transport contracts: interruptible and firm. Interruptible contracts are best effort agreements. Firm contracts are guaranteed agreements. Typically, the tenor of interruptible contracts is short (one month or less), while the one of firm contracts is longer. Shippers pay a demand charge (reservation fee) to reserve firm transport capacity and a commodity charge (execution fee) to use this capacity. Interruptible contracts include only the commodity charge.
Shippers also must provide the pipeline an amount of natural gas used as fuel by the compressor stations to transport their natural gas. This fuel requirement is specified through a fuel rate.
The commodity and fuel rates are specified at the zone to zone level. The majority of pipeline capacity is sold in advance on a firm basis. We focus on firm contracts.
A network transport contract specifies a collection of time periods (its tenor), two sets of receipt and delivery points, the capacity limit at each of these points, the set of links that associate (a subset of) the receipt points to (a subset of) the delivery points, and the commodity and fuel rates for each of these links. These attributes of a contract determine its value, which shippers use to decide how much to bid for the contract demand charge.
Two typical contract tenors are November-March (heating season) and April-October, but multiyear contracts also are common. A contract can be interpreted as a collection of subcontracts, one for each period in its tenor, as during each such period shippers have the option to ship natural gas up to the contracted capacity. That is, capacity unutilized in a given period cannot be utilized at a later time. Thus, without loss of generality, we only consider contracts with a single period tenor. We denote by T the start of this period and refer to the contract tenor as time period T .
The contract receipt and delivery points correspond to specific locations along a pipeline, where natural gas is physically injected into and withdrawn out of the pipeline, respectively.
From a commercial perspective, these points are associated with the pipeline zones. The links that connect these points in the contract, rather than in the pipeline system, restrict how the natural gas injected at the receipt points is withdrawn at the delivery points. That is, they constrain the shipping of this natural gas from these receipt to these delivery points. These links are also used to determine the commodity and fuel related charges paid by a shipper for the natural gas transported by the pipeline. We denote by R and D the sets of receipt and delivery points, respectively, in a given contract. The point capacities indicate the maximal amount of natural gas a shipper owning such a contract can inject/withdraw at each receipt/delivery point in each time period in the contract tenor. The capacities of each receipt point i ∈ R and delivery point j ∈ D are denoted by C i and C j , respectively, and are measured in MMBtu/day. The logistic structure of a network contract can be represented as a bipartite graph with node capacities. We let the sets D(i) and R(j) include the delivery points connected to receipt point i ∈ R and the receipt points connected to delivery point j ∈ D, respectively.
We denote by k ij the commodity rate, measured in $/MMBtu, to ship natural gas on the contractual link i-j, i ∈ R, j ∈ D, during time period T . The fuel rate associated with shipping natural gas on the contractual link i-j during time period T is φ ij ∈ [0, 1). This rate is used to estimate as φ ij /(1 − φ ij ) the fuel required by the compressors to ship one unit of natural gas on this link. This fuel is procured by the shipper at location i. The actual fuel burned obviously depends on how natural gas is shipped by the pipeline, but in practice this level of detail is not captured at the contract level. This is why the fuel rate only depends on the receipt and delivery points. The commodity and fuel rates play important roles in defining the notion of net price spreads (see expression (1) in §4).
Shippers purchase firm transport contracts several months before their usage (see, e.g., Knowles and Wirick 1998) . We denote by 0 the time when a contract is transacted. During time period T , the merchant owning this contract buys natural gas at the market hubs corresponding to its receipt points, uses this contract to ship the purchased natural gas to one or more of its delivery points, where the delivered natural gas is sold at their corresponding market hubs. Purchases and sales occur during the same time period because natural gas is received and delivered simultaneously by the pipeline (but, clearly, the received natural gas is not the delivered natural gas). This physical trading activity is subject to the contract point capacities.
Transport contracts can specify flexibility in the usage of reserved receipt and/or delivery capacity. A contract with receipt flexibility specifies a receipt set capacity C R , and gives the shipper the ability to choose how to allocate this capacity to the contract receipt points contingent on the price realizations at time T . That is, the maximal amount of natural gas that the shipper can ask the pipeline company to transport during time period T from all the contract receipt points combined is C R , but the shipper does not need to specify the allocation of C R to each receipt point at time 0. A contract with delivery flexibility is analogous to a contract with receipt flexibility, with the receipt set capacity replaced by the delivery set capacity C D . A contract with both receipt and delivery flexibility specifies a single capacity C R,D that indicates the maximal amount of natural gas that the shipper can ask the pipeline company to transport from any subset of the contract receipt points to any subset of the contract delivery points, as constrained by the contract links, during time period T .
To illustrate, consider the network displayed in Figure As a transport contract is transacted at time 0 and shipping decisions are made at time T for time period T , this contract can be interpreted as a European (real) option with maturity time T . The problem studied in this paper is that of computing the value of such a contract at time 0 and the Greeks of this contract at any time in the time interval [0, T ). Valuing this contract is equivalent to determining the time 0 value of its time T optimal operating policy, which includes both the time T optimal physical trading policy at the receipt and delivery points and the optimal shipping policy from the receipt to the delivery points. The contract Greeks are partial derivatives of the contract value with respect to market parameters. As discussed in §1, the contract value at time 0 is used to support a shipper's decision on how much to bid for the contract demand charge. If the contract is transacted, shippers can use the contract operating policy to support their physical trading and transport decisions at time T .
In addition, as further discussed in the Online Appendix, shippers can use the contract Greeks to support their financial hedging decisions during the time interval [0, T ).
Valuation of Contracts without Flexibility
The valuation of a network transport contract can be approached via risk neutral valuation techniques (see, e.g., Luenberger 1998 , Chapters 8-9, Duffie 2001 , Chapters 2 and 6). Risk neutral valuation is applicable if a futures market exists at each point of a given network transport contract. In the U.S., the main financial contracts relevant for valuation purposes are NYMEX natural gas futures, whose delivery point is Henry Hub, Louisiana. In addition, NYMEX and ICE trade basis swaps, which are financial contracts that do not entail physical delivery. While futures exist only at Henry Hub, by definition of basis swap, the sum of the Henry Hub futures price and a basis swap price for a given maturity yields a futures price for the basis swap location. Hence, valuation by risk neutral methods is possible for contracts that involve a large number of markets.
We take time T to correspond to the time when natural gas futures and basis swaps are settled, which is three business days prior to the beginning of a given month. We assume that this is when merchants decide how much natural gas to ship during each day of the ensuing month, which we interpret as time period T . This is realistic: in practice shippers nominate their monthly shipping decisions to pipelines during bid week, the week prior to each shipping month (Eydeland and Wolyniec 2003, Chapter 1) . Thus, replication of the contract cash flows can be performed by trading futures and basis swaps at each of its receipt and delivery points.
Shippers can modify their monthly nominations within the shipping month, e.g., in response to changes in the spot prices relative to the settled futures prices. We do not model these daily nomination updates, but our model could be modified accordingly in a straightforward manner by dividing the monthly time period T into weekly or daily subperiods. In this case, financial replication could be performed by using balance of the month/week contracts or Gas Daily options (Eydeland and Wolyniec 2003, Chapter 4) .
In §4.1, §4.2, and §4.3, respectively, we discuss the exact, greedy based, and spread option based valuation of contracts without flexibility.
Exact Approach
We introduce some additional notation to formulate our model. We define by P := R ∪ D the set of all points. The futures price at time t ∈ [0, T ] with maturity at time T for point ∈ P is F (t, T ); if t = T this is a spot price in our model. Since T is fixed and we focus on computing the contract value at time 0, we use F to denote F (0, T ) and f to denote F (T, T ). We define the time T value of shipping one unit of natural gas from receipt point i to delivery point j net of the commodity rate and fuel requirement as the following net spot price spread:
In this definition, the commodity rate k ij plays the role of a strike price, and the fuel adjustment factor 1/(1 − φ ij ) is the sum of one unit of natural gas shipped from point i to point j and the amount of fuel purchased at point i, that is, 1
Let v denote the value of the contract cash flows at contract execution time T . This is a daily value. A monthly value can be obtained by multiplying v by the number of days in a given month. That is, all cash flows incurred during time period T are accounted for at time T . The time T value of a contract with dedicated capacity is the optimal objective function value of the following linear program:
i∈R(j)
In model (2)- (5) each decision variable w ij represents the flow of natural gas from receipt point i to delivery point j during each day in time period T , net of fuel. That is, the fuel needed to ship one unit of natural gas from point i to point j is assumed to be consumed upon receipt at point i. Thus, each receipt point capacity C i is also expressed net of fuel.
As of time 0, the optimal objective function value of model (2)- (5) is a random variable that depends on the uncertain time T prices at the receipt and delivery points. We denote by E time 0 conditional expectation with respect to the risk neutral joint probability distribution of random vector (f , ∈ P) given vector (F , ∈ P). This distribution exists under standard assumptions that we suppose to hold here (see, e.g., Duffie 2001 , Shreve 2004 ). The risk free interest rate is r. The risk free discount factor from time T back to time 0 is exp(−rT ), which we define as δ. The contract value at time 0 is V := δE [v] .
In general, it is difficult to express v in closed form. Even if this were possible, it typically is impossible to obtain a closed form expression for V . For example, for a contract with only one receipt point and one delivery point, v reduces to the payoff of a spread option with positive strike price, for which no closed form expressions are known under common models of commodity price dynamics Durrleman 2003, Li et al. 2008 ).
Thus, given a model that represents the risk neutral evolution of the futures prices at the receipt and delivery points, we numerically estimate V using linear programming and Monte Carlo simulation. This approach is exact aside from simulation error. Moreover, it can accommodate a variety of models of futures price dynamics because it only uses samples of the futures prices at the contract execution time. Specifically, we generate a large number of such price samples, we compute the discounted value δv corresponding to each such sample, and estimate V by averaging all these discounted values.
The computation of the v values requires solving to optimality a large number of small linear programs (see §6.2). In our software implementation we use the free linear programming solver Clp of COIN-OR (www.coin-or.org) and take advantage of its re-solving capability. That is, we construct the constraint matrix (3)- (5) once, and use the initialSolve method to optimally solve model (2)-(5) on the first price sample. On all the remaining samples, we only update the objective function of this model using the setObjective method, and reoptimize the resulting model using the resolve method. This makes our implementation efficient.
It is useful to distinguish between the value of a transport contract due to current price information and the one due to price uncertainty. Denote by V I the time 0 intrinsic value (Hull 2012, p. 201) of such a transport. This is the value of making shipping decisions based only on the prices available at time 0. We define
Consistent with the discussion in McDonald and Siegel (1985, p. 332) , it is easy to show that the intrinsic value of a transport contract does not exceed its value, that is, V I V . The extrinsic value of a transport contract, defined by V E := V − V I , is the value of price uncertainty. In §6.2 we quantify the intrinsic and extrinsic values of our transport contract instances.
Greedy Approach
Linear programming is needed to optimally solve model (2)- (5) because, in general, this linear program does not admit a simple optimal solution. In particular, due to the interplay between the net price spreads and the capacity constraints, it can be optimal to ship natural gas along the least valued link but not along the highest valued link in the contract network. However,
we also investigate solving model (2)- (5) heuristically in a faster fashion, using GA.
GA. Given a sample realization of prices at time T :
Step 1.
Step 2. Compute the positive part s + ij of each net price spread s ij , that is, s
, sort the resulting terms in decreasing order, and store them in a stack. Set
Step 3. If the stack is empty or its first element is zero, stop and return v GA and w := (w ij , i ∈ R, j ∈ D(i)). Otherwise, remove the first element s
Step 4. Set RC i ← RC i − w ij and DC j ← DC j − w ij . Go to Step 3.
The time 0 contract value obtained using GA is V GA := δE[v GA ], and can be estimated by Monte Carlo simulation in a manner analogous to the estimation of V .
To support our claim that using GA to heuristically solve model (2)- (5) is faster than solving this model exactly by linear programming, let m and n be the cardinalities of sets R and D, respectively, and define M := m + n and N := mn. GA can be implemented in O(N log N ) time, which is the time complexity of sorting (Knuth 1998, Chapter 5) , the most computationally demanding GA step. Suppose that linear program (2)- (5) is solved using the simplex algorithm (Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis 1997, Chapter 3) . Although this algorithm has exponential time complexity, it has been observed to be efficient in practice (Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis 1997, § §3.7-3.8, §8.1) . We expect GA to be more efficient than this algorithm because O(M N ) is the time complexity of a single iteration of the (revised) simplex algorithm applied to model (2)-(5) (Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis 1997, §3.3) , and
Our computational results discussed in §6.2 are consistent with this statement. Moreover, using a polynomial time algorithm in lieu of the simplex algorithm to solve linear program (2)- (5) is unlikely to be more efficient than using GA, as the time complexity of a single iteration of such algorithms is larger than that of GA (see Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis 1997, Chapters 8-9 for details).
Of course, GA in general is heuristic. But in §6.2 we observe that GA is nearly optimal on our instances. Proposition 1 provides some support for our computational observations by stating one case in which GA is provably optimal.
Proposition 1 (GA optimality). If the fuel and commodity rates do not depend on a specific link, then GA optimally solves model (2)-(5).

Spread Option Approach
The spread option approach values a contract at V SO , which is the optimal objective function value of the linear program
where S
is the undiscounted value of an option on s + ij , that is, a spread option. The value of a spread option cannot be computed exactly with common models of commodity prices, such as that used in §6. However, in these cases one can use closed form approximations, such as those of Kirk (1995) , Carmona and Durrleman (2003) , and Li et al. (2008) .
The spread option based approach is extremely practical. First, one computes the values of all the relevant spread options. Second, one determines a portfolio of spread options whose notional amounts are given by an optimal solution to (7). Once the portfolio composition is determined, the value of the contract is the value of this portfolio. We take this approach as representative of spread option based methods used in practice (see the discussion in §1).
Proposition 2 establishes that in general this valuation approach outperforms the intrinsic valuation approach but is suboptimal (this result assumes that V SO is computed using exact spread option values).
Proposition 2 (Spread option valuation). It holds that
The intuition behind the suboptimality of the spread option approach rests on the observation that model (7) only captures part of the optionality embedded in a network contract:
once the optimal spread option portfolio is determined at time 0, one does retain the option to transport natural gas at time T on link i-j, but this option is constrained by the decision made at time 0 on the maximum amount of gas to be shipped on this link at time T . Put differently, the spread option approach is optimal, provided that each spread option is valued exactly, when the maximum amount of natural gas that can be optimally transported along a link does not depend on knowledge of the prices realized at time T . This occurs when the receipt or the delivery point sets are singletons, in which case this maximum for link i-j is min{C i , C j }. In §6.2 we assess the valuation performance of model (7) applied to our instances.
Valuation of Contracts with Flexibility
In this section we discuss the valuation of contracts with receipt and/or delivery flexibility. This is analogous to the valuation of contracts without this flexibility, with the only modification of the linear program (2)-(5) that computes the value of such a contract at time T , that is, v.
Consider a contract with receipt flexibility. The time T value of the optimal cash flows of this contract can be obtained by solving the following linear program:
The analogous linear program for a contract with delivery flexibility is max w i∈R j∈D(i)
j∈D i∈R(j)
The corresponding linear program for a contract with both receipt and delivery flexibility is max w i∈R j∈D(i)
Proposition 3 states that these linear programs admit greedy optimal solutions and characterizes them. (8)- (11), (12)- (15), and (16) Proposition 3 simplifies the valuation of contracts with receipt and/or delivery flexibility, as linear programming software is not needed for this purpose.
Proposition 3 (Flexible contracts). The linear programs
It is clear that a contract with flexibility is more valuable than a comparable contract without flexibility; that is, a dedicated capacity contract with i∈R
and min{ i∈R C i , j∈D C j } = C R,D for the case of receipt, delivery, and receipt and delivery flexibility, respectively. In §6.2 we quantify the incremental value of flexibility on our contract instances.
The spread option approach can easily be adapted to value contracts with receipt and/or delivery flexibility by modifying the linear program (7). Specifically, the relevant linear programs to value contracts with receipt flexibility, delivery flexibility, and both receipt and delivery flexibility have the same objective function of the linear program (7) and the following constraints, respectively: (9)- (11), (13)- (15), and (17)- (18). In §6.2 we compare the valuations of our approach and this modified spread option approach on our contract instances.
Computational Results
In this section we present our computational results on the comparison of the valuations of our approach and the spread option approach. Before discussing these results, we illustrate the data and the test instances used.
Data and Instances
We base our computational analysis on the Transcontinental pipeline system (see Figure 1 ). We We assume that the natural logarithms of the spot prices at these locations follow correlated mean reverting processes, an extension of a well known reduced form model of commodity price evolution discussed, among others, by Schwartz (1997) (see Secomandi 2010a for the two location case and Hahn and Dyer 2008 for the cross commodity case). This is a simple model that captures the spatial structure of the correlation among the prices at these locations, but is limited in the type of correlation term structure that it can represent at each location. Because we focus on a single maturity (December 2006), this modeling choice seems reasonable for our purposes. In this model the risk neutral dynamics of the time t futures price with maturity at
and κ are the volatility and speed of mean reversion, respectively, of the natural logarithm of the spot price at location , and dW (t) is an increment to a standard Brownian motion for location . Moreover, these increments for two distinct locations and are correlated with We calibrate the parameters of this model by simple linear regression using our spot price data (Clewlow and Strickland 2000, §3.2.2) . We need to estimate κ and σ M R for each location ∈ P := {Henry Hub, Zones 1-4}, and ρ M R for each pair of locations and ∈ P with = (ρ M R := 1). Table 1 reports the estimates of these parameters, each denoted by·, and their standard errors. We compute the standard errors of the speeds of mean reversion using standard properties of the slope estimate of each simple linear regression model. We obtain the standard errors of the volatility and instantaneous correlation parameters by a bootstrapping approach applied to the residuals of each estimated simple linear regression model. Table 1 shows that the speeds of mean reversion can be estimated with substantially less precision than the other parameters (the standard errors of the speed of mean reversion, volatility, and correlation estimates are within 33-38%, 4-8%, and 1-2% of their respective estimates). We use the parameter estimates in Table 1 in our computational study.
We consider the three contract networks shown in Figure 3 . These are realistic configurations chosen upon examination of real contracts available on the Transcontinental pipeline online information system. Network 1R-2D models a contract with one receipt and two delivery points, network 2R-2D a contract with two receipt and two delivery points, and network 2R-3D a contract with two receipt and three delivery points. The numbers associated with each point are the point capacities, expressed in MMBtu/day. The term of each contract is December 2006, but we focus on the first day of this month. We use the commodity and fuel rates reported in (c) 2R-3D
Figure 3: Contract networks used in our computational study (the leftmost/rightmost nodes are the receipt/delivery points, and the displayed numerical values are the point capacities expressed in MMBtu/day). Table 3 displays the valuation and computational performance of the exact version of our method on our three test instances. We varied the number of price sample paths from 10,000 to 100,000 in increments of 10,000, but for brevity we include in this table only our results obtained with 10,000, 20,000, 50,000, and 100,000 samples. For all these instances, the estimated contract Of course, obtaining more precise contract value estimates by increased sampling requires more Cpu seconds. (All the methods that we consider were coded in C++ and compiled using the g++ compiler. The reported Cpu times were obtained on a computer with one 2.20 GHz processor and 1.96 GB of RAM. We solved all the relevant linear programs using the Clp linear programming solver; see §4.) For the 1R-2D instance, the Cpu seconds increase from 1.30 with 10,000 samples to 13.17 with 100,000 samples; for the 2R-2D instance these figures are 2.00 and 19.94; and for the 2R-3D instance they are 2.31 and 23.09. As expected, the Cpu seconds increase proportionally to the number of samples (these times include the computation of all the Greeks discussed in Appendix B, as well as the intrinsic, extrinsic, and spread option based contract values). Despite the additional computational effort needed to obtain more precise contract value estimates, it seems fair to conclude that the exact version of our method is computationally efficient. Table 4 shows that the contract value estimates of the GA version of our method, each denoted byV GA , and their precisions essentially match those of the exact version of our method on the three considered instances with the same 100,000 samples, but can be computed with a much smaller computational effort. Thus, on these instances, the GA version of our method is a fast and accurate heuristic with the same precision of the exact method.
Results
The second and third columns of Table 5 report the intrinsic and estimated extrinsic values, V I andV E , as fractions of the contract value estimates obtained by the exact method with 100,000 samples. The 1R-2D instance exhibits a very large estimated extrinsic value (93.17%).
This is due to the two spread options that represent this contract being almost at the money at contract inception, so that there is significant uncertainty as to whether these options would expire in or out of the money. The estimated extrinsic values of the 2R-2D and 2R-3D contracts are lower than that of the 1R-2D contract, but still substantial (51.45% in the 2R-2D case and 48.92% in the 2R-3D case). This is due to the Zone 1-4 net price spread being deep in the money at contract inception time, so that the Zone 1-4 link will be used with high probability at expiration. Thus, the contract intrinsic values play more important roles in the 2R-2D and 2R-3D cases than in the 1R-2D case.
The last column of Table 5 compares the valuation performance of the spread option heuristic to the one of the exact version of our method. We estimate the relevant spread option values by Monte Carlo simulation using the same samples used by our exact method. We focus on of the contract values estimated by our exact method. Thus, methods used in practice can substantially undervalue network contracts relative to our exact method.
As pointed out in §4.3, this valuation gap occurs because the spread option heuristic is unable to fully capture the extrinsic value of these contracts. To illustrate, consider the 2R-2D
contract. The spread option heuristic assigns zero and positive flows, respectively, to the Zone 1-3 and Zone 1-4 spread options at contract inception. If the Zone 1-4 spread option is out of the money at contract expiration, no injection is made in Zone 1. However, if in this case the Zone 1-3 spread option is in the money, it may be optimal to ship natural gas from Zone 1 to Zone 3, which is feasible for the exact model but impossible for the given solution of the spread option heuristic. Moreover, even when both the Zone 1-3 and Zone 1-4 spread options expire in the money, it may be optimal to ship natural gas from Zone 1 to Zone 3, rather than from Zone 1 to Zone 4. By not fully capturing these features, the spread option heuristic underestimates the contract value. In contrast, Monte Carlo simulation allows one to include these aspects in the valuation model, and is thus central to correctly estimate the contract value.
As discussed in §5, adding flexibility to a contract with dedicated capacity usage obviously increases its value. instance only delivery flexibility is relevant). Specifically, the estimated incremental value of receipt, delivery, and receipt and delivery flexibility, respectively, varies in between 38% and 58%, 16% and 43%, and 89% and 105%. These estimated value improvements are remarkable.
Interesting, the estimated incremental value of adding both receipt and delivery flexibility to a contract with dedicated capacity usage exceeds the sum of the estimated incremental values obtained by adding either receipt or delivery flexibility to such a contract. This suggests a complementarity relationship between the two types of flexibility. Table 7 displays the fractions of the estimated values of the contracts with flexibility captured by the spread option approach. The suboptimality of this approach in this case is more pronounced than in the case of contracts with dedicated capacity usage.
Conclusions
In this paper we deal with the merchant management of network contracts for the transport capacity of natural gas pipelines, specific energy conversion assets. We show that real option models used in practice by merchants to support the management of these contracts in general are heuristic, due to their use of suboptimal operating policies. We propose a different real option approach based on an optimal operating policy, integrating in a computationally efficient fashion linear optimization and Monte Carlo simulation. We use our approach to benchmark the spread option approach using market data and realistic instances. We find that our method can significantly improve on the spread option based valuations of these contracts, especially for contracts with flexibility in their allowed capacity usage. Such flexible contracts can be optimally managed using a greedy operating policy. This in general does not hold for contracts with dedicated capacity usage, but, on our instances, using a greedy operating policy to manage these contracts is near optimal and yields substantial computational savings relative to using an optimal operating policy. As discussed in the Online Appendix, the use of direct sensitivity estimation techniques is critical for efficient estimation of the Greeks with our proposed approach.
Our research is relevant to merchants that ship natural gas on pipelines, as it can improve the effectiveness of their operations. A major international energy trading company recently implemented a version of our approach. Our work has potential relevance beyond the specific application of this paper, for instance the real option management of shipping, transportation, distribution, and refining capacity for other energy sources and commodities, such as coal, oil, biofuels, metals, and agricultural products, including corn and soybean. These are examples of a more general area of research and applications on the merchant management of commodity and energy conversion assets.
This topic is related to business-to-business commerce and contracting in capital intensive industries (Kleindorfer and Wu 2003) and exhibits important real option capacity valuation issues (Birge 2000) . In these settings, extensions of our model may include the addition of lead times and/or inventory, and the consideration of market frictions, such as transaction costs and market power. For example, in a recent paper, Martínez-de-Albéniz and Vendrell Simón (2009) study the point-to-point version of the problem studied in this paper, that is, the problem considered by Secomandi (2010a) , from the point of view of a trader with market power.
Our work could be extended by considering different data sets. Moreover, in this paper we use a multilocation version of a single factor mean reverting model of the evolution of natural gas futures prices. Our study could be extended by using multilocation versions of multifactor models of the evolution of commodity and energy prices, such as those of Schwartz and Smith (2002) and Routledge et al. (2000 Routledge et al. ( , 2001 . Formally investigating the observed complementarity between receipt and delivery flexibility and how to optimally configure a contract subject to constraints on the pipeline capacity availability and/or a merchant's capital accessibility also would be of interest.
Online Appendix
A Proofs of the Results in the Main Text
Proof of Proposition 1 (GA optimality). Define the purchase decision variable w R i := j∈D(i) w ij for each receipt point i ∈ R and the sale decision variable w D j := i∈R(j) w ij for each delivery point j ∈ D. Also define f i := f i /(1 − φ) − k for all i ∈ R, where k is the commodity rate and φ is the fuel rate, which are the same for all links. Given the stated assumptions and with this notation, model (2)- (5) can be equivalently reformulated as follows:
This model can be solved to optimality in a sequential fashion using the algorithm now discussed, which is evidently equivalent to GA. Set all the decision variables to zero. Define the purchase price set as {f i , i ∈ R} and the sale price set as {f j , j ∈ D}. Form two lists by ordering the elements of the purchase price set in increasing order and the elements of the sale price set in decreasing order. Perform the following steps:
Step 1. If the sale price list is empty then stop. Otherwise, select the delivery point corresponding to the top element of the sale price list.
Step 2. Pick the receipt point associated with the first element of the purchase price list such that this point is linked to the delivery point selected in Step 1. If there is no element in the purchase price list whose associated point is connected to this delivery point, delete the top element of the sale price list and return to Step 1.
Step 3. Increase the values of the purchase and sale decision variables and the flow decision variable associated with the receipt point selected in
Step 2 and the delivery point selected in
Step 1 by an amount equal to the minimum of the remaining capacities of these points. Update these point capacities accordingly. Remove from the purchase and sale price lists, respectively, the elements corresponding to each one of these points if the updated remaining capacity of such a point is zero.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Spread option valuation).
Let w I and w SO be optimal solutions to models (6) and (7), respectively. It follows from the inequality s ij s + ij and the martingale property of futures prices under the risk neutral measure that S ij S + ij . The solution w I is feasible for model (7). Thus, it holds that
As the solution w SO is feasible for model (2)- (5) for every realization of the time T prices, it holds that
Proof of Proposition 3 (Flexible contracts)
. Consider a contract with receipt flexibility.
Given the shared receipt capacity, at optimality the graph for this contract is equivalent to a modified graph obtained by collapsing the receipt points into a single fictitious receipt point with capacity equal to C R , and defining the net price spread for each delivery point j ∈ D relative to this fictitious receipt point as s i * (j)j := max i∈R(j) s ij . Given that this modified graph has a single receipt point, it admits a greedy optimal solution, obtained using the greedy algorithm for contracts with receipt flexibility stated below. The equivalence at optimality between the original graph and the modified graph implies that this greedy solution is also optimal for the linear program (8)-(11).
The greedy algorithm for contracts with receipt flexibility is as follows. Set all the flows from the fictitious receipt point to each delivery point to zero. Define the positive part of net spot price spread between delivery point j and this fictitious receipt point as s
Include in set D + all the delivery points j ∈ D for which s + i * (j)j is strictly positive (the set D + depends on the spot prices, but, for ease of exposition, this is not reflected in our notation). If C R j∈D + C j , then let the flow from the fictitious receipt point to each delivery point j ∈ D + be equal to C j . Otherwise, first arrange the delivery points in set D + in decreasing order of their respective net spot price spreads relative to the fictitious receipt point, and define RC := C R . Let j (1) be the first element of this list. For each delivery point j ∈ D + , let i * (j) be an element of the set arg max i∈R(i) s ij . Set the flow from receipt point i * (j (1) ) to delivery point j (1) equal to min{RC, C j (1) }, and update RC to RC − min{RC, C j (1) }.
Then repeat this step for all the other elements of the sorted list of delivery points.
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The resulting greedy solution can be used to obtain an optimal solution for the linear program (8)- (11) as follows. Set all the decision variables of this linear program to zero. For each delivery point j ∈ D + , set the decision variable w i * (j)j equal to the flow from the fictitious receipt point to delivery point j determined by the stated greedy algorithm. By construction, the resulting solution is such that each delivery point receives natural gas from at most one receipt point.
The claimed results for the linear program (12)- (15) can be shown in an analogous manner.
The ones for the linear program (16)- (18) are obvious.
B Sensitivities (Greeks)
In this section we apply direct sensitivity estimation techniques to derive estimators for the contract Greeks, which merchants use to implement standard financial hedging approaches, e.g., delta, gamma, and vega hedging (see, e.g., , Chapter 6, Hull 2012 .
These estimators can be used to compute unbiased estimates of the Greeks by Monte Carlo simulation using the same price samples used to estimate the contract value V . To avoid clutter, we only discuss the computation of the Greeks at time 0, but our results hold when time 0 is replaced with a later time, in which case V is to be interpreted as the contract value at this time.
The ensuing development requires specifying a model of the risk neutral dynamics of the relevant futures prices. We employ the following model:
with σ (t, T ) the volatility of F (t, T ), dW (t, T ) an increment to a standard Brownian motion, and ρ (T ) the instantaneous correlation coefficient between dW (t, T ) and dW (t, T ), for all , ∈ P and = (these quantities are specific to maturity T ).
Model (19)- (20) (Lai et al. 2010) . From this perspective, one obtains model (19)- (20) by restricting attention to a single maturity and by considering multiple locations.
Model (19)- (20) includes the mean reverting specification used in §6 by defining σ (t, T ) := σ M R exp[−κ (T − t)] and ρ (T ) := ρ M R , and letting the relevant standard Brownian motion increments be independent of the maturity T . We also use this specification of model (21) in Proposition 5.
For the ensuing development it is useful to express model (19)- (20) as follows:
here
and y is the -th element of an n dimensional multivariate normal random vector y with mean vector 0 and variance-covariance matrix Σ whose element
We assume throughout that Σ is positive definite.
The deltas are the first partial derivatives of the contract value with respect to each futures price: Delta := ∂V /∂F . We first apply the pathwise method to obtain a delta expression.
The basic idea behind this technique is to view v(θ) as a function of a parameter θ, in this case
F , obtain the pathwise derivative ∂v(θ)/∂θ, and estimate the relevant Greek by leveraging the expression ∂V /∂θ = δE [∂v(θ) /∂θ]. The theoretical underpinning here is the interchange of expectation and differentiation (a limit) by an application of the dominated convergence theorem Glasserman 1996, Glasserman 2004, §7.2) . Proposition 4 presents a pathwise delta expression. To streamline the exposition, we denote by w * an optimal solution vector for the relevant linear program, that is, one of (2)- (5), (8)- (11), (12)- (15), and (16)- (18), and define
Proposition 4 (Pathwise deltas). Under model (21) it holds that
Proof. Expression (22) follows easily if conditions (A1)-(A4) in Appendix A in Broadie and Glasserman (1996) are satisfied. We show that they are below. We let θ = F and denote the dependence of the price f on θ by f (θ). (2)- (5), (8)- (11), (12)- (15), and (16)- (18). Let s 1 and s 2 be the net price spread vectors corresponding to the two price vectors f 1 and f 2 , respectively. Pick w ∈ W. For each link i-j such that i ∈ R and j ∈ D(i), the feasibility of w implies that
Moreover, for each such link i-j, we have
Inequalities (23)- (24) imply that
Denote by h(f, w) the objective function of the relevant linear program, that is, one of (2)- (5), (8)- (11), (12)- (15), and (16)- (18). Also define
It follows from (25) that
Thus, the function h(f, w) is Lipschitz continuous in f for each given w ∈ W. Define by W E the set of extreme points of set W, a finite set.
in Dudley (2002, p. 391) implies that v(f ) is Lipschitz continuous in f .
(A4) Each random variable f is almost surely Lipschitz with integrable modulus exp(α +Y ) To this end, we define µ := ln F + α , for all ∈ P, and
so that x := (x , ∈ P) ∼ N (µ, Σ), with µ := (µ , ∈ P). We denote by g(·) the risk neutral probability density function of x.
The basic idea behind the likelihood ratio method is to compute the Greeks by exploiting the dependence of g(·) on a parameter of interest θ (this is not restricted to be F ). Following Broadie and Glasserman (1996) and Glasserman (2004, §7.3) , expressing this dependence as g θ (·) and the dependence of v on x as v(x), we can write V = δ p v(x)g θ (x)dx, where p is the cardinality of set P (for simplicity we use the same notation to denote both the random variable x and each of its realizations). Assuming that exchanging differentiation and integration is warranted and definingġ θ (x) := ∂g θ (x)/∂θ andg θ (x) := ∂ġ θ (x)/∂θ, it holds that
The key to applying the likelihood ratio method is to find expressions forġ θ (x)/g θ (x) and g θ (x)/g θ (x). Lemma 1 presents such expressions: (29)-(31) are available in Glasserman (2004, Examples 7.3.4, 7.3.7) and (32) denotes z A −1 (θ). We denote the trace of · by tr(·).
Lemma 1 (Glasserman 2004 with extension). Consider model (26).
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(a) If µ depends on θ but Σ does not theṅ
(c) If both µ and Σ depend on θ theṅ
Proof. We first derive part (c), that is, (32). Expressions (29) and (31) in parts (a) and (b), available in Glasserman (2004, Examples 7.3.4, 7. 3.7) without proof, follow from our proof as special cases. Recall that
Jacobi's formula, d|Σ(θ)| = |Σ(θ)|tr(Σ −1 (θ)dΣ(θ)), and the equality
Define q as the following function of θ:
This implies that
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It follows from (33), (34), and (35) thaṫ
which establishes (32).
For completeness, we derive (30) in part (a), stated in Glasserman (2004, Example 7.3.7) without proof. The equalityġ
It follows from these equalities thaẗ
Expression (29) is equivalent to
It follows from this expression and matrix calculus that
Expressions (36), (37), and (38) and additional rearranging implÿ 
when dealing with Vega below). Also, when displaying an array we assume that < . Recall that p is the number of elements of set P. It holds that 
By (51), (53), and (41), (31) can be expressed aṡ
Expression (46) . . . 
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By (54), (55), (57), (42), and (43), (32) can be expressed aṡ
This and (27) imply (47). Expression (49) follows from the definition of µ and (39), (50) from (40).
The terms defined in (41) and (42) and used in (46) and (47), respectively, are deterministic.
They can hence be computed before performing a Monte Carlo simulation.
It is possible to combine the pathwise and likelihood ratio methods to obtain hybrid gamma estimators, as in Glasserman and Zhao (1999) and Glasserman (2004, §7.3.3) . The motivation for doing so is the potentially increased precision (reduced standard error) of the resulting estimators relative to the likelihood ratio gamma estimator, as suggested by the results reported by these authors. Proposition 6 provides expressions for these hybrid estimators. 
Proposition 6 (Hybrid gammas). Under model (26), applying the pathwise and the likelihood ratio methods in this and the reverse order, respectively, yields
Gamma = E[G (b − 1)]/F , ∀ ∈ P,(58)
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Rewriting the term on the right hand side of (44) 
Using (61) in (60) yields (59).
Resimulation (Glasserman 2004, §7.1 ) is an alternative approach to estimating the Greeks, but its estimates are both biased and more computational intensive to compute than the direct sensitivity estimates. Numerical results with the dedicated capacity instances, not reported here due to space limitations, suggest that resimulation delivers accurate estimates of the Greeks, which can be more precise than the estimates obtained with the likelihood ratio method. However, the computational requirement of resimulation puts it at a marked disadvantage relative to the direct estimation techniques. The use of direct estimation techniques is thus crucial to make our proposed approach computationally efficient. These results also confirm the usefulness of using hybrid gamma estimators to improve the precision of the likelihood ratio gamma estimates. Further, the GA based direct version of our method strikes an excellent compromise between the precision of its Greek estimates and its Cpu requirement (recall that GA also computes near optimal valuations on the instances considered in §6.2).
